This is present in ioFog 2.0, but the same code is also part of the most recent development branch.
To my understanding of the code, the validator only checks if the server presents at least one certificate which is signed by the trust anchor. However, this can basically be any certificate.
Additionally, timestamps and hostnames not checked.
If this is the case, then I think a CVE ID should be assigned.\
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This is present in ioFog 2.0, but the same code is also part of the most
recent development branch.
To my understanding of the code, the validator only checks if the server
presents at least one certificate which is signed by the trust anchor.
However, this can basically be any certificate.
Additionally, timestamps and hostnames not checked.
If this is the case, then I think a CVE ID should be assigned.\
AFAIK that code is intended to accept any certificate signed by the configured trust anchor. Why is this(In reply to Wayne Beaton from comment #0)
From the security inbox:
--
To me it looks like as if the ioFog agent fails to properly validate server
side TLS certificates:
This is present in ioFog 2.0, but the same code is also part of the most
recent development branch.
To my understanding of the code, the validator only checks if the server
presents at least one certificate which is signed by the trust anchor.
However, this can basically be any certificate.
Additionally, timestamps and hostnames not checked.
If this is the case, then I think a CVE ID should be assigned.\
What changes to the code are you suggesting apart from checking hostnames/timestamps?
What changes to the code are you suggesting apart from checking
hostnames/timestamps?
Jens, can you answer this?
Has Bugzilla been updated since the 1900s?
Stable software can be off-putting. Having said that, we are in the process of moving all of this stuff over to GitLab.
We use Bugzilla primarily because it provides a means to restrict the visibility of vulnerability reports until we're ready to disclose.
If Bugzilla hurts your eyes, then please add a SECURITY[.md] file to your repositories with specific instructions on how to report vulnerabilities for your project and we'll follow that.
We have some ongoing work to sort out a template here [1]
Please not that on some older systems like Debian 9 we get \
Provision failed with error message: "Unexpected error: java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException: the trustAnchors parameter must be non-empty"\
This is fixed by updating certs in /etc/ssl/certs/. I have only done this by manually copying over the cert files from a working system during debugging. Not sure what ca-certificates command etc could be the proper fix.