Skip to content
Snippets Groups Projects

Compare revisions

Changes are shown as if the source revision was being merged into the target revision. Learn more about comparing revisions.

Source

Select target project
No results found
Select Git revision

Target

Select target project
  • eclipse/oniro-core/linux
  • bero/linux
  • idlethread/linux
  • agherzan/linux-oniro
4 results
Select Git revision
Show changes
Showing
with 1635 additions and 407 deletions
......@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ PAGE_SIZE multiple when read back.
Note that all fields in this file are hierarchical and the
file modified event can be generated due to an event down the
hierarchy. For for the local events at the cgroup level see
hierarchy. For the local events at the cgroup level see
memory.events.local.
low
......@@ -2056,6 +2056,17 @@ Cpuset Interface Files
The value of "cpuset.mems" stays constant until the next update
and won't be affected by any memory nodes hotplug events.
Setting a non-empty value to "cpuset.mems" causes memory of
tasks within the cgroup to be migrated to the designated nodes if
they are currently using memory outside of the designated nodes.
There is a cost for this memory migration. The migration
may not be complete and some memory pages may be left behind.
So it is recommended that "cpuset.mems" should be set properly
before spawning new tasks into the cpuset. Even if there is
a need to change "cpuset.mems" with active tasks, it shouldn't
be done frequently.
cpuset.mems.effective
A read-only multiple values file which exists on all
cpuset-enabled cgroups.
......@@ -2159,19 +2170,19 @@ existing device files.
Cgroup v2 device controller has no interface files and is implemented
on top of cgroup BPF. To control access to device files, a user may
create bpf programs of the BPF_CGROUP_DEVICE type and attach them
to cgroups. On an attempt to access a device file, corresponding
BPF programs will be executed, and depending on the return value
the attempt will succeed or fail with -EPERM.
A BPF_CGROUP_DEVICE program takes a pointer to the bpf_cgroup_dev_ctx
structure, which describes the device access attempt: access type
(mknod/read/write) and device (type, major and minor numbers).
If the program returns 0, the attempt fails with -EPERM, otherwise
it succeeds.
An example of BPF_CGROUP_DEVICE program may be found in the kernel
source tree in the tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dev_cgroup.c file.
create bpf programs of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE and attach
them to cgroups with BPF_CGROUP_DEVICE flag. On an attempt to access a
device file, corresponding BPF programs will be executed, and depending
on the return value the attempt will succeed or fail with -EPERM.
A BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE program takes a pointer to the
bpf_cgroup_dev_ctx structure, which describes the device access attempt:
access type (mknod/read/write) and device (type, major and minor numbers).
If the program returns 0, the attempt fails with -EPERM, otherwise it
succeeds.
An example of BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE program may be found in
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dev_cgroup.c in the kernel source tree.
RDMA
......
......@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ source for the output is in brackets ("[]").
[NR_CPUS-1]
offline: CPUs that are not online because they have been
HOTPLUGGED off (see cpu-hotplug.txt) or exceed the limit
of CPUs allowed by the kernel configuration (kernel_max
above). [~cpu_online_mask + cpus >= NR_CPUS]
HOTPLUGGED off or exceed the limit of CPUs allowed by the
kernel configuration (kernel_max above).
[~cpu_online_mask + cpus >= NR_CPUS]
online: CPUs that are online and being scheduled [cpu_online_mask]
......@@ -96,5 +96,5 @@ online.)::
possible: 0-127
present: 0-3
See cpu-hotplug.txt for the possible_cpus=NUM kernel start parameter
as well as more information on the various cpumasks.
See Documentation/core-api/cpu_hotplug.rst for the possible_cpus=NUM
kernel start parameter as well as more information on the various cpumasks.
This diff is collapsed.
......@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ Device Mapper
dm-dust
dm-ebs
dm-flakey
dm-ima
dm-init
dm-integrity
dm-io
......
......@@ -78,13 +78,23 @@ Status:
2. the number of blocks
3. the number of free blocks
4. the number of blocks under writeback
5. the number of read requests
6. the number of read requests that hit the cache
7. the number of write requests
8. the number of write requests that hit uncommitted block
9. the number of write requests that hit committed block
10. the number of write requests that bypass the cache
11. the number of write requests that are allocated in the cache
12. the number of write requests that are blocked on the freelist
13. the number of flush requests
14. the number of discard requests
Messages:
flush
flush the cache device. The message returns successfully
Flush the cache device. The message returns successfully
if the cache device was flushed without an error
flush_on_suspend
flush the cache device on next suspend. Use this message
Flush the cache device on next suspend. Use this message
when you are going to remove the cache device. The proper
sequence for removing the cache device is:
......@@ -98,3 +108,5 @@ Messages:
6. the cache device is now inactive and it can be deleted
cleaner
See above "cleaner" constructor documentation.
clear_stats
Clear the statistics that are reported on the status line
......@@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@
65 = /dev/infiniband/issm1 Second InfiniBand IsSM device
...
127 = /dev/infiniband/issm63 63rd InfiniBand IsSM device
128 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0 First InfiniBand verbs device
129 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1 Second InfiniBand verbs device
192 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0 First InfiniBand verbs device
193 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1 Second InfiniBand verbs device
...
159 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31 31st InfiniBand verbs device
223 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31 31st InfiniBand verbs device
232 char Biometric Devices
0 = /dev/biometric/sensor0/fingerprint first fingerprint sensor on first device
......
......@@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
--------------------------------------------------------
1. For MDS
~~~~~~~~~~
Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all
siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing
code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the
sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes
(host or guest mode).
2. For L1TF
~~~~~~~~~~~
......
......@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
multihit.rst
special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
core-scheduling.rst
l1d_flush.rst
L1D Flushing
============
With an increasing number of vulnerabilities being reported around data
leaks from the Level 1 Data cache (L1D) the kernel provides an opt-in
mechanism to flush the L1D cache on context switch.
This mechanism can be used to address e.g. CVE-2020-0550. For applications
the mechanism keeps them safe from vulnerabilities, related to leaks
(snooping of) from the L1D cache.
Related CVEs
------------
The following CVEs can be addressed by this
mechanism
============= ======================== ==================
CVE-2020-0550 Improper Data Forwarding OS related aspects
============= ======================== ==================
Usage Guidelines
----------------
Please see document: :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
<set_spec_ctrl>` for details.
**NOTE**: The feature is disabled by default, applications need to
specifically opt into the feature to enable it.
Mitigation
----------
When PR_SET_L1D_FLUSH is enabled for a task a flush of the L1D cache is
performed when the task is scheduled out and the incoming task belongs to a
different process and therefore to a different address space.
If the underlying CPU supports L1D flushing in hardware, the hardware
mechanism is used, software fallback for the mitigation, is not supported.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The kernel command line allows to control the L1D flush mitigations at boot
time with the option "l1d_flush=". The valid arguments for this option are:
============ =============================================================
on Enables the prctl interface, applications trying to use
the prctl() will fail with an error if l1d_flush is not
enabled
============ =============================================================
By default the mechanism is disabled.
Limitations
-----------
The mechanism does not mitigate L1D data leaks between tasks belonging to
different processes which are concurrently executing on sibling threads of
a physical CPU core when SMT is enabled on the system.
This can be addressed by controlled placement of processes on physical CPU
cores or by disabling SMT. See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation
document: :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
**NOTE** : The opt-in of a task for L1D flushing works only when the task's
affinity is limited to cores running in non-SMT mode. If a task which
requested L1D flushing is scheduled on a SMT-enabled core the kernel sends
a SIGBUS to the task.
......@@ -287,13 +287,21 @@
do not want to use tracing_snapshot_alloc() as it needs
to be done where GFP_KERNEL allocations are allowed.
allow_mismatched_32bit_el0 [ARM64]
Allow execve() of 32-bit applications and setting of the
PER_LINUX32 personality on systems where only a strict
subset of the CPUs support 32-bit EL0. When this
parameter is present, the set of CPUs supporting 32-bit
EL0 is indicated by /sys/devices/system/cpu/aarch32_el0
and hot-unplug operations may be restricted.
See Documentation/arm64/asymmetric-32bit.rst for more
information.
amd_iommu= [HW,X86-64]
Pass parameters to the AMD IOMMU driver in the system.
Possible values are:
fullflush - enable flushing of IO/TLB entries when
they are unmapped. Otherwise they are
flushed before they will be reused, which
is a lot of faster
fullflush - Deprecated, equivalent to iommu.strict=1
off - do not initialize any AMD IOMMU found in
the system
force_isolation - Force device isolation for all
......@@ -380,6 +388,9 @@
arm64.nopauth [ARM64] Unconditionally disable Pointer Authentication
support
arm64.nomte [ARM64] Unconditionally disable Memory Tagging Extension
support
ataflop= [HW,M68k]
atarimouse= [HW,MOUSE] Atari Mouse
......@@ -1255,7 +1266,7 @@
The VGA and EFI output is eventually overwritten by
the real console.
The xen output can only be used by Xen PV guests.
The xen option can only be used in Xen domains.
The sclp output can only be used on s390.
......@@ -1747,6 +1758,11 @@
support for the idxd driver. By default it is set to
true (1).
idxd.tc_override= [HW]
Format: <bool>
Allow override of default traffic class configuration
for the device. By default it is set to false (0).
ieee754= [MIPS] Select IEEE Std 754 conformance mode
Format: { strict | legacy | 2008 | relaxed }
Default: strict
......@@ -1944,18 +1960,17 @@
this case, gfx device will use physical address for
DMA.
strict [Default Off]
With this option on every unmap_single operation will
result in a hardware IOTLB flush operation as opposed
to batching them for performance.
Deprecated, equivalent to iommu.strict=1.
sp_off [Default Off]
By default, super page will be supported if Intel IOMMU
has the capability. With this option, super page will
not be supported.
sm_on [Default Off]
By default, scalable mode will be disabled even if the
hardware advertises that it has support for the scalable
mode translation. With this option set, scalable mode
will be used on hardware which claims to support it.
sm_on
Enable the Intel IOMMU scalable mode if the hardware
advertises that it has support for the scalable mode
translation.
sm_off
Disallow use of the Intel IOMMU scalable mode.
tboot_noforce [Default Off]
Do not force the Intel IOMMU enabled under tboot.
By default, tboot will force Intel IOMMU on, which
......@@ -2047,13 +2062,12 @@
throughput at the cost of reduced device isolation.
Will fall back to strict mode if not supported by
the relevant IOMMU driver.
1 - Strict mode (default).
1 - Strict mode.
DMA unmap operations invalidate IOMMU hardware TLBs
synchronously.
Note: on x86, the default behaviour depends on the
equivalent driver-specific parameters, but a strict
mode explicitly specified by either method takes
precedence.
unset - Use value of CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_{LAZY,STRICT}.
Note: on x86, strict mode specified via one of the
legacy driver-specific options takes precedence.
iommu.passthrough=
[ARM64, X86] Configure DMA to bypass the IOMMU by default.
......@@ -2421,6 +2435,23 @@
feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
Default is 1 (enabled)
l1d_flush= [X86,INTEL]
Control mitigation for L1D based snooping vulnerability.
Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
internal buffers which can forward information to a
disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
attack, to access data to which the attacker does
not have direct access.
This parameter controls the mitigation. The
options are:
on - enable the interface for the mitigation
l1tf= [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
affected CPUs
......@@ -4167,6 +4198,15 @@
Format: <bool> (1/Y/y=enable, 0/N/n=disable)
default: disabled
printk.console_no_auto_verbose=
Disable console loglevel raise on oops, panic
or lockdep-detected issues (only if lock debug is on).
With an exception to setups with low baudrate on
serial console, keeping this 0 is a good choice
in order to provide more debug information.
Format: <bool>
default: 0 (auto_verbose is enabled)
printk.devkmsg={on,off,ratelimit}
Control writing to /dev/kmsg.
on - unlimited logging to /dev/kmsg from userspace
......@@ -4777,7 +4817,7 @@
reboot= [KNL]
Format (x86 or x86_64):
[w[arm] | c[old] | h[ard] | s[oft] | g[pio]] \
[w[arm] | c[old] | h[ard] | s[oft] | g[pio]] | d[efault] \
[[,]s[mp]#### \
[[,]b[ios] | a[cpi] | k[bd] | t[riple] | e[fi] | p[ci]] \
[[,]f[orce]
......@@ -4945,8 +4985,6 @@
sa1100ir [NET]
See drivers/net/irda/sa1100_ir.c.
sbni= [NET] Granch SBNI12 leased line adapter
sched_verbose [KNL] Enables verbose scheduler debug messages.
schedstats= [KNL,X86] Enable or disable scheduled statistics.
......
......@@ -13,10 +13,8 @@ Hotkeys
The following FN keys are ignored by the kernel without this driver:
- FN-F1 (LG control panel) - Generates F15
- FN-F5 (Touchpad toggle) - Generates F13
- FN-F5 (Touchpad toggle) - Generates F21
- FN-F6 (Airplane mode) - Generates RFKILL
- FN-F8 (Keyboard backlight) - Generates F16.
This key also changes keyboard backlight mode.
- FN-F9 (Reader mode) - Generates F14
The rest of the FN keys work without a need for a special driver.
......
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
========================
Monitoring Data Accesses
========================
:doc:`DAMON </vm/damon/index>` allows light-weight data access monitoring.
Using DAMON, users can analyze the memory access patterns of their systems and
optimize those.
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 2
start
usage
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
===============
Getting Started
===============
This document briefly describes how you can use DAMON by demonstrating its
default user space tool. Please note that this document describes only a part
of its features for brevity. Please refer to :doc:`usage` for more details.
TL; DR
======
Follow the commands below to monitor and visualize the memory access pattern of
your workload. ::
# # build the kernel with CONFIG_DAMON_*=y, install it, and reboot
# mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug/
# git clone https://github.com/awslabs/damo
# ./damo/damo record $(pidof <your workload>)
# ./damo/damo report heat --plot_ascii
The final command draws the access heatmap of ``<your workload>``. The heatmap
shows which memory region (x-axis) is accessed when (y-axis) and how frequently
(number; the higher the more accesses have been observed). ::
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000
111121111111111111111111111111211111111111111111111111110000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001555552000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000222223555552000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000011111677775000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000488888000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000177888400000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000046666522222100000000000000000000
000000000000000000000014444344444300000000000000000000000000
000000000000000002222245555510000000000000000000000000000000
# access_frequency: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# x-axis: space (140286319947776-140286426374096: 101.496 MiB)
# y-axis: time (605442256436361-605479951866441: 37.695430s)
# resolution: 60x10 (1.692 MiB and 3.770s for each character)
Prerequisites
=============
Kernel
------
You should first ensure your system is running on a kernel built with
``CONFIG_DAMON_*=y``.
User Space Tool
---------------
For the demonstration, we will use the default user space tool for DAMON,
called DAMON Operator (DAMO). It is available at
https://github.com/awslabs/damo. The examples below assume that ``damo`` is on
your ``$PATH``. It's not mandatory, though.
Because DAMO is using the debugfs interface (refer to :doc:`usage` for the
detail) of DAMON, you should ensure debugfs is mounted. Mount it manually as
below::
# mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug/
or append the following line to your ``/etc/fstab`` file so that your system
can automatically mount debugfs upon booting::
debugfs /sys/kernel/debug debugfs defaults 0 0
Recording Data Access Patterns
==============================
The commands below record the memory access patterns of a program and save the
monitoring results to a file. ::
$ git clone https://github.com/sjp38/masim
$ cd masim; make; ./masim ./configs/zigzag.cfg &
$ sudo damo record -o damon.data $(pidof masim)
The first two lines of the commands download an artificial memory access
generator program and run it in the background. The generator will repeatedly
access two 100 MiB sized memory regions one by one. You can substitute this
with your real workload. The last line asks ``damo`` to record the access
pattern in the ``damon.data`` file.
Visualizing Recorded Patterns
=============================
The following three commands visualize the recorded access patterns and save
the results as separate image files. ::
$ damo report heats --heatmap access_pattern_heatmap.png
$ damo report wss --range 0 101 1 --plot wss_dist.png
$ damo report wss --range 0 101 1 --sortby time --plot wss_chron_change.png
- ``access_pattern_heatmap.png`` will visualize the data access pattern in a
heatmap, showing which memory region (y-axis) got accessed when (x-axis)
and how frequently (color).
- ``wss_dist.png`` will show the distribution of the working set size.
- ``wss_chron_change.png`` will show how the working set size has
chronologically changed.
You can view the visualizations of this example workload at [1]_.
Visualizations of other realistic workloads are available at [2]_ [3]_ [4]_.
.. [1] https://damonitor.github.io/doc/html/v17/admin-guide/mm/damon/start.html#visualizing-recorded-patterns
.. [2] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.heatmap.1.png.html
.. [3] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.wss_sz.png.html
.. [4] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.wss_time.png.html
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
===============
Detailed Usages
===============
DAMON provides below three interfaces for different users.
- *DAMON user space tool.*
This is for privileged people such as system administrators who want a
just-working human-friendly interface. Using this, users can use the DAMON’s
major features in a human-friendly way. It may not be highly tuned for
special cases, though. It supports only virtual address spaces monitoring.
- *debugfs interface.*
This is for privileged user space programmers who want more optimized use of
DAMON. Using this, users can use DAMON’s major features by reading
from and writing to special debugfs files. Therefore, you can write and use
your personalized DAMON debugfs wrapper programs that reads/writes the
debugfs files instead of you. The DAMON user space tool is also a reference
implementation of such programs. It supports only virtual address spaces
monitoring.
- *Kernel Space Programming Interface.*
This is for kernel space programmers. Using this, users can utilize every
feature of DAMON most flexibly and efficiently by writing kernel space
DAMON application programs for you. You can even extend DAMON for various
address spaces.
Nevertheless, you could write your own user space tool using the debugfs
interface. A reference implementation is available at
https://github.com/awslabs/damo. If you are a kernel programmer, you could
refer to :doc:`/vm/damon/api` for the kernel space programming interface. For
the reason, this document describes only the debugfs interface
debugfs Interface
=================
DAMON exports three files, ``attrs``, ``target_ids``, and ``monitor_on`` under
its debugfs directory, ``<debugfs>/damon/``.
Attributes
----------
Users can get and set the ``sampling interval``, ``aggregation interval``,
``regions update interval``, and min/max number of monitoring target regions by
reading from and writing to the ``attrs`` file. To know about the monitoring
attributes in detail, please refer to the :doc:`/vm/damon/design`. For
example, below commands set those values to 5 ms, 100 ms, 1,000 ms, 10 and
1000, and then check it again::
# cd <debugfs>/damon
# echo 5000 100000 1000000 10 1000 > attrs
# cat attrs
5000 100000 1000000 10 1000
Target IDs
----------
Some types of address spaces supports multiple monitoring target. For example,
the virtual memory address spaces monitoring can have multiple processes as the
monitoring targets. Users can set the targets by writing relevant id values of
the targets to, and get the ids of the current targets by reading from the
``target_ids`` file. In case of the virtual address spaces monitoring, the
values should be pids of the monitoring target processes. For example, below
commands set processes having pids 42 and 4242 as the monitoring targets and
check it again::
# cd <debugfs>/damon
# echo 42 4242 > target_ids
# cat target_ids
42 4242
Note that setting the target ids doesn't start the monitoring.
Turning On/Off
--------------
Setting the files as described above doesn't incur effect unless you explicitly
start the monitoring. You can start, stop, and check the current status of the
monitoring by writing to and reading from the ``monitor_on`` file. Writing
``on`` to the file starts the monitoring of the targets with the attributes.
Writing ``off`` to the file stops those. DAMON also stops if every target
process is terminated. Below example commands turn on, off, and check the
status of DAMON::
# cd <debugfs>/damon
# echo on > monitor_on
# echo off > monitor_on
# cat monitor_on
off
Please note that you cannot write to the above-mentioned debugfs files while
the monitoring is turned on. If you write to the files while DAMON is running,
an error code such as ``-EBUSY`` will be returned.
Tracepoint for Monitoring Results
=================================
DAMON provides the monitoring results via a tracepoint,
``damon:damon_aggregated``. While the monitoring is turned on, you could
record the tracepoint events and show results using tracepoint supporting tools
like ``perf``. For example::
# echo on > monitor_on
# perf record -e damon:damon_aggregated &
# sleep 5
# kill 9 $(pidof perf)
# echo off > monitor_on
# perf script
......@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ the Linux memory management.
concepts
cma_debugfs
damon/index
hugetlbpage
idle_page_tracking
ksm
......
......@@ -245,6 +245,13 @@ MPOL_INTERLEAVED
address range or file. During system boot up, the temporary
interleaved system default policy works in this mode.
MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
This mode specifices that the allocation should be preferrably
satisfied from the nodemask specified in the policy. If there is
a memory pressure on all nodes in the nodemask, the allocation
can fall back to all existing numa nodes. This is effectively
MPOL_PREFERRED allowed for a mask rather than a single node.
NUMA memory policy supports the following optional mode flags:
MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES
......@@ -253,10 +260,10 @@ MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES
nodes changes after the memory policy has been defined.
Without this flag, any time a mempolicy is rebound because of a
change in the set of allowed nodes, the node (Preferred) or
nodemask (Bind, Interleave) is remapped to the new set of
allowed nodes. This may result in nodes being used that were
previously undesired.
change in the set of allowed nodes, the preferred nodemask (Preferred
Many), preferred node (Preferred) or nodemask (Bind, Interleave) is
remapped to the new set of allowed nodes. This may result in nodes
being used that were previously undesired.
With this flag, if the user-specified nodes overlap with the
nodes allowed by the task's cpuset, then the memory policy is
......
......@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ compaction_proactiveness
This tunable takes a value in the range [0, 100] with a default value of
20. This tunable determines how aggressively compaction is done in the
background. Setting it to 0 disables proactive compaction.
background. Write of a non zero value to this tunable will immediately
trigger the proactive compaction. Setting it to 0 disables proactive compaction.
Note that compaction has a non-trivial system-wide impact as pages
belonging to different processes are moved around, which could also lead
......
......@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ On PowerPC
On other
If you know of the key combos for other architectures, please
let me know so I can add them to this section.
submit a patch to be included in this section.
On all
Write a character to /proc/sysrq-trigger. e.g.::
......@@ -205,10 +205,12 @@ frozen (probably root) filesystem via the FIFREEZE ioctl.
Sometimes SysRq seems to get 'stuck' after using it, what can I do?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
That happens to me, also. I've found that tapping shift, alt, and control
on both sides of the keyboard, and hitting an invalid sysrq sequence again
will fix the problem. (i.e., something like :kbd:`alt-sysrq-z`). Switching to
another virtual console (:kbd:`ALT+Fn`) and then back again should also help.
When this happens, try tapping shift, alt and control on both sides of the
keyboard, and hitting an invalid sysrq sequence again. (i.e., something like
:kbd:`alt-sysrq-z`).
Switching to another virtual console (:kbd:`ALT+Fn`) and then back again
should also help.
I hit SysRq, but nothing seems to happen, what's wrong?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
......
......@@ -58,11 +58,19 @@ Kirkwood family
- Product Brief : https://web.archive.org/web/20120616201621/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/88F6180-003_ver1.pdf
- Hardware Spec : https://web.archive.org/web/20130730091654/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/HW_88F6180_OpenSource.pdf
- Functional Spec: https://web.archive.org/web/20130730091033/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/FS_88F6180_9x_6281_OpenSource.pdf
- 88F6280
- Product Brief : https://web.archive.org/web/20130730091058/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/88F6280_SoC_PB-001.pdf
- 88F6281
- Product Brief : https://web.archive.org/web/20120131133709/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/88F6281-004_ver1.pdf
- Hardware Spec : https://web.archive.org/web/20120620073511/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/HW_88F6281_OpenSource.pdf
- Functional Spec: https://web.archive.org/web/20130730091033/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/FS_88F6180_9x_6281_OpenSource.pdf
- 88F6321
- 88F6322
- 88F6323
- Product Brief : https://web.archive.org/web/20120616201639/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/assets/88f632x_pb.pdf
Homepage:
https://web.archive.org/web/20160513194943/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/kirkwood/
Core:
......@@ -89,6 +97,10 @@ Discovery family
- MV76100
- Product Brief : https://web.archive.org/web/20140722064429/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/discovery-innovation/assets/MV76100-002_WEB.pdf
- Hardware Spec : https://web.archive.org/web/20140722064425/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/discovery-innovation/assets/HW_MV76100_OpenSource.pdf
- Functional Spec: https://web.archive.org/web/20111110081125/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/discovery-innovation/assets/FS_MV76100_78100_78200_OpenSource.pdf
Not supported by the Linux kernel.
Core:
......@@ -124,17 +136,24 @@ EBU Armada family
Armada 38x Flavors:
- 88F6810 Armada 380
- 88F6811 Armada 381
- 88F6821 Armada 382
- 88F6W21 Armada 383
- 88F6820 Armada 385
- 88F6825
- 88F6828 Armada 388
- Product infos: https://web.archive.org/web/20181006144616/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/armada-38x/
- Functional Spec: https://web.archive.org/web/20200420191927/https://www.marvell.com/content/dam/marvell/en/public-collateral/embedded-processors/marvell-embedded-processors-armada-38x-functional-specifications-2015-11.pdf
- Hardware Spec: https://web.archive.org/web/20180713105318/https://www.marvell.com/docs/embedded-processors/assets/marvell-embedded-processors-armada-38x-hardware-specifications-2017-03.pdf
- Design guide: https://web.archive.org/web/20180712231737/https://www.marvell.com/docs/embedded-processors/assets/marvell-embedded-processors-armada-38x-hardware-design-guide-2017-08.pdf
Core:
ARM Cortex-A9
Armada 39x Flavors:
- 88F6920 Armada 390
- 88F6925 Armada 395
- 88F6928 Armada 398
- Product infos: https://web.archive.org/web/20181020222559/http://www.marvell.com/embedded-processors/armada-39x/
......