[Eclipse Mosquitto] Integer Overflow in Will Delay Comparator Permanently Suppresses All Delayed Will Messages
From ML:
**Integer Overflow in Will Delay Comparator Permanently
Suppresses All Delayed Will Messages**
The will_delay__cmp() function in src/will_delay.c uses (int)(uint32_t uint32_t) to compare will delay intervals when inserting entries into a sorted linked list. When the unsigned difference between two intervals exceeds INT32_MAX, the (int) cast wraps to a negative value, corrupting the sort order. A single unauthenticated attacker connection with will_delay_interval = UINT32_MAX (a spec-compliant value) causes the attacker’s entry to sort before all other entries. The broker’s will_delay__check() function stops at the first future-dated entry and returns — permanently skipping all subsequent entries.
This suppresses will message delivery for every other client on the broker until the broker is restarted.
**Finding Description**
MQTT v5 introduces the Will Delay Interval property, which controls how long the broker waits after an unexpected client disconnect before publishing that client’s will (Last Will and Testament) message. The broker stores pending will entries in a doubly-linked list sorted by delay interval using the will_delay__cmp() comparator function and the DL_INSERT_INORDER macro from the utlist library.
The vulnerability is in the comparator function:
```
// src/will_delay.c:31-34
static int will_delay__cmp(struct will_delay_list *i1, struct
,→ will_delay_list *i2)
{
return (int)(i1->context->will_delay_interval -
,→ i2->context->will_delay_interval);
}
```
will_delay_interval is declared as uint32_t at lib/mosquitto_internal.h:339.
The MQTT v5 specification (Section 3.1.3.2.2) defines it as a Four Byte Integer with valid range 0 to 4,294,967,295 seconds.
The subtraction uint32_t - uint32_t produces a uint32_t result (unsigned
arithmetic wraps modulo 2ˆ32). The subsequent (int) cast reinterprets values above INT32_MAX (2,147,483,647) as negative. This is a well-known antipattern in C comparator functions (commonly cited in qsort documentation).
Example with attacker interval = UINT32_MAX (4,294,967,295) and
victim interval = 3:
```
cmp(attacker, victim) = (int)(4294967295 - 3)
= (int)(4294967292) // uint32_t result
= -4 // reinterpreted as signed: > INT32_MAX
```
The negative result tells DL_INSERT_INORDER that the attacker’s entry is “less than” the victim’s, so the attacker sorts first in the list — the opposite of correct behavior.
The same result occurs regardless of insertion order. If the victim is
already in the list when the attacker is inserted:
`cmp(attacker, victim) = (int)(UINT32_MAX - 3) = -4 → attacker before victim`
If the attacker is already in the list when the victim is inserted:
`cmp(victim, attacker) = (int)(3 - UINT32_MAX) = (int)(4) = 4 → victim after attacker`
Both orderings produce the corrupted list: [Attacker(UINT32_MAX),
Victim(3)].
The critical consumer is will_delay__check():
```
// src/will_delay.c:78-106
void will_delay__check(void)
{
// ...
DL_FOREACH_SAFE(delay_list, item, tmp){
if(item->context->will_delay_time <= db.now_real_s){
DL_DELETE(delay_list, item);
item->context->will_delay_interval = 0;
item->context->will_delay_entry = NULL;
context__send_will(item->context);
// ... cleanup ...
}else{
loop__update_next_event((item->context->will_delay_time -
,→ db.now_real_s)*1000);
return; // STOPS checking. All subsequent entries are
,→ SKIPPED.
}
}
}
```
This function is called periodically from the broker’s main event loop. It iterates the sorted list and fires will messages whose delay has elapsed. When it encounters the first entry whose will_delay_time is still in the future, it updates the next event timer and returns immediately. So, it relies on the list being correctly sorted so all earlier-expiring entries come first.
When the attacker’s entry (with will_delay_time approximately 136 years
in the future) is first in the list, the else branch fires immediately, and the function returns without checking any other entries. All victims’ will messages are permanently suppressed.
**Code inconsistency**: One interersting aspect of note is that the equivalent comparator for session expiry (src/session_expiry.c:32-41) uses the correct pattern:
```
static int session_expiry__cmp(struct session_expiry_list *i1, struct
,→ session_expiry_list *i2)
{
if(i1->context->session_expiry_time ==
,→ i2->context->session_expiry_time){
return 0;
}else if(i1->context->session_expiry_time >
,→ i2->context->session_expiry_time){
return 1;
}else{
return -1;
}
}
```
So, the will_delay__cmp function was likely written separately without following
the established pattern.
**Evidence**
**Test environment:**
• Mosquitto v2.1.2 (commit 189e3703) compiled with AddressSanitizer
(-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g -O1)
• Configuration: allow_anonymous true, default settings, listener on
127.0.0.1:1883
• macOS Darwin 24.0.0, 64-bit
• PoC script: exploit.py
**1. Baseline - Delayed will delivery works correctly without attacker:**
A client connected with will_delay_interval = 3 and a will message on topic will/baseline. A subscriber monitored will/#. The client’s TCP connection was closed (ungraceful disconnect, triggering will delivery). Script output shown
below.
[Phase 0] BASELINE: Verify delayed will works normally
```
Subscriber ready on will/#
Baseline victim connected (reason=0)
Baseline victim disconnected, waiting up to 8s...
BASELINE PASS: Will delivered after 3.0s (expected ~3s)
```
Broker log show below confirms delivery (timestamps are Unix epoch):
```
1770960875: Client baseline-victim [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960878: Sending PUBLISH to baseline-sub (..., 'will/baseline', ... (11 bytes))
The will fired exactly 3 seconds after disconnect. This establishes the expected behavior.
```
**2. Attack — single attacker connection suppresses victim’s will:**
An attacker connected with will_delay_interval = 4294967295 (UINT32_MAX,
~136 years) and disconnected. Then a victim connected with will_delay_interval = 3 and disconnected. The subscriber monitored for 13 seconds. Exploit script output shown below.
```
[Phase 1] ATTACK: Attacker creates will with delay=UINT32_MAX
Attacker connected (reason=0)
Attacker disconnected → UINT32_MAX entry in will_delay list
[Phase 2] VICTIM: Connects with will_delay=3s, disconnects
Victim connected (reason=0)
Victim disconnected, polling for will delivery...
[Phase 3] Polling for 13s (victim's will should fire after 3s)...
RESULTS:
Baseline (no attacker): DELIVERED after 3.0s
Victim (with attacker): NOT DELIVERED in 13s
```
Broker log shown below demonstrates that the victim connected and disconnected, but no PUBLISH was ever sent for the victim’s will:
```
1770960879: New client connected [...] as attacker-will (p5, c1, k60).
1770960879: Will message specified (8 bytes) (r0, q0).
1770960879: Client attacker-will [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960880: New client connected [...] as victim-suppressed (p5, c1, k60).
1770960880: Will message specified (17 bytes) (r0, q0).
1770960880: Client victim-suppressed [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960893: Client attack-sub [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
```
Between the victim’s disconnect (1770960880) and the subscriber’s close
(1770960893), there is no Sending PUBLISH line for the victim’s will. The
broker accepted both connections and will messages, but the victim’s will was never delivered.
**3. Mass suppression — Blocking more than one victim (five):**
One attacker connected with will_delay_interval = UINT32_MAX and discon-
nected. Five victims then connected with will_delay_interval = 2 each and disconnected. Exploit script output shown below.
```
[Phase 4] MULTI-VICTIM: Confirming suppression at scale
5/5 victim wills suppressed, 0/5 delivered
CONFIRMED: Mass will suppression from single attacker connection
```
Broker log below shows all 5 victims connected and disconnected, but no
PUBLISH for any victim’s will:
```
1770960894: New client connected [...] as mv-0 (p5, c1, k60). Will message specified.
1770960894: Client mv-0 [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960894: New client connected [...] as mv-1 (p5, c1, k60). Will message specified.
1770960894: Client mv-1 [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960894: New client connected [...] as mv-2 (p5, c1, k60). Will message specified.
1770960895: Client mv-2 [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960895: New client connected [...] as mv-3 (p5, c1, k60). Will message specified.
1770960895: Client mv-3 [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
1770960895: New client connected [...] as mv-4 (p5, c1, k60). Will message specified.
1770960895: Client mv-4 [...] disconnected: connection closed by client.
```
No Sending PUBLISH lines appear between any victim disconnect and the test end.
**4. Persistence — Suppression survives across connections:**
When the exploit was re-run without restarting the broker, the baseline test itself failed because the attacker’s UINT32_MAX entry from the previous run was still in the will_delay list:
```
[Phase 0] BASELINE: Verify delayed will works normally
BASELINE FAIL: Will not delivered in 8s
Cannot proceed — will delivery broken. Aborting.
```
This demonstrates that a single attacker connection permanently poisons the will_delay list. The suppression persists until the broker process is restarted.
**Impact**
**Denial of Service — Will Message Suppression**
An unauthenticated attacker (on brokers with allow_anonymous true) can
permanently suppress all delayed will messages for all clients on the broker with a single MQTT CONNECT and disconnect. The attack requires:
• One TCP connection
• One valid MQTT v5 CONNECT packet with will_delay_interval =
4294967295 (a spec-compliant value)
• Closing the connection (triggering will delay processing)
After this single interaction, no delayed will messages from any client will ever be delivered until the broker is restarted.
What will messages are used for: Will messages (Last Will and Testament)
are MQTT’s primary disconnect detection mechanism. When a client disconnects unexpectedly, the broker publishes the client’s pre-registered will message to notify subscribers. This is used in:
• IoT device health monitoring — “device offline” notifications for fleet
management
• Industrial control systems (ICS/SCADA) — safety-critical disconnect
detection for actuators, valves, and sensors
• Medical device monitoring — patient monitoring equipment discon-
nection alerts
• Smart building/home automation — security sensor offline notifica-
tions
Suppressing will messages means subscribers are never notified when a device disconnects, potentially masking equipment failures, security incidents, or safety-
critical events.
**Affected configurations:** - Any Mosquitto v2.x broker accepting MQTT v5 connections from untrusted networks - allow_anonymous true enables pre-authentication exploitation - Brokers requiring authentication are still vulnerable to any authenticated client - The attacker uses only spec-compliant MQTT protocol values (no malformed packets) - The attack is invisible to the victim clients — they connect and disconnect normally
**Not affected:** - Clients using will_delay_interval = 0 (immediate will delivery bypasses the sorted list) - MQTT v3.1.1 connections (will_delay_interval is an MQTT v5 feature) - Session expiry (uses a correctly-implemented comparator
at session_expiry.c:32-41)
**Recommendation**
Replace the buggy comparator with the correct pattern already used in
session_expiry__cmp():
> static int will_delay__cmp(struct will_delay_list *i1, struct
> ,→ will_delay_list *i2)
> {
> if(i1->context->will_delay_interval ==
> ,→ i2->context->will_delay_interval){
> return 0;
> }else if(i1->context->will_delay_interval >
> ,→ i2->context->will_delay_interval){
> return 1;
> }else{
> return -1;
> }
> }
Additionally, fix the multiplication overflow at line 56:
> // Before (overflows uint32_t for intervals > ~49 days):
loop__update_next_event(item->context->will_delay_interval * 1000);
> // After (cast to time_t before multiplying):
loop__update_next_event((time_t)item->context->will_delay_interval *
,→ 1000);
**Reproduction**
**Prerequisites:**
Mosquitto v2.1.2 source, Python 3, anonymous access enabled.
**Minimal configuration (mosquitto_poc.conf):**
listener 1883 127.0.0.1
allow_anonymous true
log_type all
log_dest stderr
**Build and run:**
```
mkdir build && cd build
cmake .. -DWITH_TLS=ON -DWITH_TESTS=OFF -DWITH_DOCS=OFF -DWITH_APPS=OFF
,→ -DWITH_CLIENTS=OFF
make -j$(nproc)
./src/mosquitto -c ../mosquitto_poc.conf -v
```
PoC:
```python3 exploit.py 127.0.0.1 1883```
Expected output:
```[Phase 0] BASELINE: Will delivered after 3.0s (expected ~3s)
[Phase 1-3] Victim will NOT DELIVERED in 13s
[Phase 4] 5/5 victim wills suppressed, 0/5 delivered
```
**To confirm persistence:**
Run the PoC again without restarting the broker. The baseline will also fail, confirming permanent suppression.
**Report in PDF format, PoC exploit and logs sent over email:**
[broker.log](/uploads/c67b65b4bbffc6fbe708d54069bb1650/broker.log)
[exploit.py](/uploads/c925c4302ac7deddc02730364fbe1479/exploit.py)
[will_delay_comparator_overflow_report.pdf](/uploads/ae4d7f518683cf1b915f285f06256b82/will_delay_comparator_overflow_report.pdf)
issue
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