[Eclipse Ditto]: the resolved policy view discloses imported and namespace-root policy entries in full to a caller with only partial READ on the source
## Summary
The resolved policy view (`GET /policies/{id}?policy-view=resolved`) merges a policy with the entries it imports and with the namespace-root policies that apply, and returns the effective policy. The result is filtered in two stages: an imported or namespace-root entry is dropped only when the caller has no READ at all on that entry in its source policy, and the merged document is then field-trimmed with the enforcer of the importing policy rather than the source policy. A caller who has only partial READ on a source entry — enough for the entry to be kept — receives it in full, including the sub-resources (its `resources`, `actions` or `subjects`) they cannot read in the source policy itself.
## Affected versions
The resolved policy view was introduced in 3.9.0 (issue #2354). Reproduced on `master` (commit `cd7f545`); worth confirming across the 3.9.x line and 3.8.x if backported. This is the default behaviour of the feature when `policy-view=resolved` is requested.
## Details
`PolicyCommandEnforcement.filterResponse` (`policies/service/.../enforcement/PolicyCommandEnforcement.java:205`) routes a resolved-view retrieve through `resolveAndRebuildResponse` and then `applyEnforcerJsonView`:
```java
if (commandResponse instanceof RetrievePolicyResponse retrieveResp
&& isResolvedView(retrieveResp.getDittoHeaders())) {
return resolveAndRebuildResponse(retrieveResp)
.thenApply(rebuilt -> applyEnforcerJsonView(rebuilt, policyEnforcer));
}
```
The first stage, `mergeAndDropUnreadable` (same file, line 263), decides per entry whether to keep it. An imported entry is removed only when `hasSourceSideRead` is false, and that check (line 332) is a *partial* permission check against the source policy's enforcer:
```java
src.getEnforcer().hasPartialPermissions(
PoliciesResourceType.policyResource("/entries/" + label), authCtx, Permission.READ);
```
`hasPartialPermissions` on `policy:/entries/<label>` is true when the caller can read the entry *or any sub-resource of it*. So a caller who can read, say, only `policy:/entries/x/subjects` in the source keeps the whole entry. Namespace-root entries are gated by the same check (line 299 onward).
The second stage, `applyEnforcerJsonView` (line 221), field-trims the merged document with `policyEnforcer.getEnforcer()` — the enforcer of the *importing* policy that was retrieved, not the source. `getJsonViewForPolicyQueryCommandResponse` (line 467) builds the view under a single resource key, `policy:/`:
```java
return enforcer.buildJsonView(resourceKey, responseEntity, authorizationContext,
POLICY_QUERY_COMMAND_RESPONSE_ALLOWLIST, Permissions.newInstance(Permission.READ));
```
The owner of the importing policy has READ on `policy:/`, so every field of the merged document, including the imported entry's sub-resources, is kept. The source policy's own field-level grants are never applied. The code comment above `mergeAndDropUnreadable` (line 258) acknowledges that broad READ on the importing policy would otherwise expose imported content; the entry-level source check was added to prevent that, but it guards whole entries only, not the fields within a kept entry.
## Proof of concept
Policy A imports entry `x` from policy B. The caller owns A (READ on `policy:/`) and has only partial READ on B's entry `x`: READ on `policy:/entries/x/subjects` but not on `policy:/entries/x/resources`.
- `GET /policies/B` field-trims `x` with B's enforcer: `subjects` is returned, `resources` is hidden.
- `GET /policies/A?policy-view=resolved` keeps `x` (partial READ passes the entry-level check) and field-trims with A's enforcer under `policy:/`, so the imported entry is returned in full — `resources` included.
The attached `F02PoC.java` models the two filtering paths and prints the divergence (`java F02PoC.java`): `x/resources` hidden on a direct read of B, disclosed through A's resolved view.
## Impact
An authenticated caller with partial READ on a source policy, plus READ on a policy that imports it (or membership of a namespace with a namespace-root policy), can read grants, resources and subjects of imported entries that they are not permitted to read in the source policy. This discloses who-has-what-access across imported and namespace-root policies and is useful for privilege-escalation reconnaissance. CWE-863 / CWE-200.
Severity: Moderate. CVSS 4.0 `AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`.
## Remediation
In the resolved view, field-trim each imported or namespace-root entry with its *source* policy's enforcer, replicating the per-entry `buildJsonView` the caller would get by reading the source directly, rather than relying on the coarse entry-level drop plus the importing policy's enforcer. A test should request the resolved view as a caller with partial READ on an imported entry and assert the unread sub-resources are absent.
## References
Issue #2354 / PR #2429 (resolved policy view). Adjacent but distinct fixes in the same 3.9.0 feature area: #2431 / #2433 (namespace-policy label shadowing) and #2414 (checkPermissions with imports); neither covers this partial-read field disclosure.
[F02PoC.java](/uploads/dfadd9926c4d7646845e2c1f0c448e3a/F02PoC.java)
issue
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