[Eclipse Ditto] : the default policy enforcer returns an incorrect "granted" result for multi-permission checks
## Summary
Ditto ships two policy enforcer implementations. The default one, the throughput-optimized "trie" enforcer, evaluates a check for several permissions at once by comparing a single aggregate grant weight against a single aggregate revoke weight. A high-weight grant on one permission then hides a higher-weight revoke on a different permission, and the check reports that all the permissions are granted when one of them is actually revoked. The alternate "tree" enforcer evaluates each permission on its own and returns the correct answer, so the two disagree on the same policy.
## Affected versions
Reproduced on `master` (commit `cd7f545`). The trie enforcer is the default evaluator. The `CheckPermissions` command and the trie evaluator are present in the supported 3.9.x and 3.8.x lines; the exact affected range is worth confirming.
## Details
`GrantRevokeIndex.hasPermissions` (`policies/model/.../enforcers/trie/GrantRevokeIndex.java:106`) decides a multi-permission check like this:
```java
final Optional<Integer> grantWeight = grantMap.getMaxNonemptyWeightForAllPermissions(subjectIds, permissions);
final Optional<Integer> revokeWeight = revokeMap.getMaxWeightForAllPermissions(subjectIds, permissions);
return grantWeight.isPresent() && (!revokeWeight.isPresent() || revokeWeight.get() < grantWeight.get());
```
The method's own Javadoc states the intended contract: "each of the given permissions is granted to some of the given authorization subject such that none of the permissions is revoked from any of the subject IDs with the same or a greater weight" — a per-permission comparison. The implementation does not do that. `getMaxNonemptyWeightForAllPermissions` (`PermissionSubjectsMap.java:113`) checks that each permission is granted somewhere and then returns the single maximum grant weight across all of them; `getMaxWeightForAllPermissions` (line 89) returns the single maximum revoke weight across all of them. The final line compares those two aggregates once. A deep, high-weight grant on one permission therefore outweighs a revoke on another, and the revoked permission is reported as granted.
The tree enforcer implements the contract correctly: `CheckPermissionsVisitor` (`enforcers/tree/CheckPermissionsVisitor.java:106-126`) compares each permission's own grant against its own revoke.
The defect is reached through the `CheckPermissions` / `CheckPolicyPermissions` command, whose purpose is to let an external application ask Ditto to decide an authorization question. `PolicyCheckPermissionsStrategy` (`.../strategies/commands/PolicyCheckPermissionsStrategy.java:93`) passes the caller's full permission set to `hasUnrestrictedPermissions` in one call. Ditto's own Thing and Policy command enforcement uses single-permission checks, which both enforcers evaluate correctly, so this is not a direct CRUD bypass; the exposure is through multi-permission callers, chiefly `CheckPermissions`.
## Proof of concept
Policy for subject `u`: WRITE granted on `thing:/`, WRITE revoked on `thing:/attributes`, READ granted on `thing:/attributes/pub`.
`CheckPermissions` for `u` on `thing:/attributes/pub` with permissions `{READ, WRITE}`:
- default (trie): granted = true.
- correct (tree, and the true policy semantics): at `thing:/attributes/pub`, WRITE has grant weight 1 against revoke weight 2, so WRITE is denied and `{READ, WRITE}` must be denied.
A check for `{WRITE}` alone returns false in both enforcers; only the multi-permission query diverges.
The attached `F03PoC.java` reproduces `GrantRevokeIndex.hasPermissions` and the two aggregations faithfully and prints `trie=true, tree=false` for `{READ, WRITE}` and `false/false` for `{WRITE}`.
## Impact
An application that delegates an authorization decision to Ditto through `CheckPermissions` can be told that a subject holds a set of permissions it does not, and grant access the policy denies. CWE-863.
Severity: High. CVSS 4.0 `AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N`; the confidentiality and integrity effect is realized in the application that trusts the verdict.
## Remediation
Compare per permission in `GrantRevokeIndex.hasPermissions`, matching the Javadoc and the tree enforcer: for every permission `p`, require a grant weight for `p` that is strictly greater than any revoke weight for `p`. Add a differential test that runs both enforcers over multi-permission policies with mixed grant and revoke weights and asserts they agree.
[F03PoC.java](/uploads/5b28e1b2ebf72ae487aa508c76badfea/F03PoC.java)
issue
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