jwks_uri from the OIDC discovery document is fetched without checking its origin or scheme
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# CVE Reservation Request
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The Eclipse Foundation is a [Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures](https://cve.mitre.org/) (CVE) Numbering Authority.
Creating this ticket initiates **reservation** of a CVE ID for the documented vulnerability. The reserved CVE ID will be posted in a comment below, and kept **confidential** until explicit publication request.
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## CVE record information
**Project name:** Eclipse CSI - PIA
**Project id:** technology.csi
**Versions affected:** <=0.8.0
**Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE):**
* CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**Common Vulnerability Scoring System:** CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
**Summary:** PIA's token verification (`verify_token` in `pia/oidc.py`) fetches the OIDC discovery document of an allowlisted issuer and then follows the `jwks_uri` contained in that response without parsing it as a URL, comparing it against the approved issuer's origin, or requiring HTTPS — the only check is that the field is non-empty (`pia/oidc.py:42-52`). An approved identity provider — and every registered per-project Jenkins instance under `https://ci.eclipse.org/<project>/oidc` is a separate such party (`pia/models.py`) — can therefore direct PIA to issue a GET request to an arbitrary host and port, including over plaintext `http`, from PIA's own network position. The fetch happens before any signature is verified, as a side effect of an unauthenticated `POST /v1/upload/sbom` request that is ultimately rejected with 401.
**Links:**
* https://github.com/eclipse-csi/pia/security/advisories/GHSA-97mq-mw55-36px
issue
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